

On the role of *abhyupagama* in Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference

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0. Introduction

As is well known, Dharmakīrti's central tenet for establishing scriptural authority is the so-called threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*), which is used for sorting out reliable from unreliable scriptures with regard to radically inaccessible states of affairs (*atyantaparokṣa*). This analysis is done by means of perception, inference functioning by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), and scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*). For a person who is searching for a reliable scripture that will definitely lead him to the final spiritual goal, this procedure, which will be described in the following, seems quite reasonable in order to examine various scriptures.

According to Dharmakīrti's PV 1.215–216, a person who is striving for a spiritual goal can determine which scriptures are unreliable by dividing their contents into three categories, namely, perceptible states of affairs (*pratyakṣa*), imperceptible states of affairs (*parokṣa*), and radically inaccessible states of affairs (*atyantaparokṣa*). These three categories are then examined by means of perception, inference functioning by the force of real entities, and scripturally based inference, respectively. Applying this process, perception, for instance, invalidates the Sāṃkhya's notion of pleasure (*sukha*) inherent in substances such as sounds, but it establish-

es the Buddhist notion of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*); the *vastubala* type of inference invalidates the Brahmanical notion of *ātman*, but it establishes the Buddhist notion of the four noble truths; and scripturally based inference invalidates the thesis that demerits (*adharmā*) are purified by ablutions (*snāna*).¹

Of the threefold analysis, the first two stages are not particularly problematic because it is commonly known that Dignāga accepted perception and inference as means of valid cognition. However, if one recalls that Dignāga rejected scriptural authority (*āgamapramāṇa*) as an independent means of valid cognition, one faces difficulties when trying to understand scripturally based inference precisely. Examples of scripturally based inference are found only twice in Dharmakīrti's entire opus: it is first used to invalidate the opponent's thesis "ablutions, etc., purify demerits," and second, mentioned with regard to two inferences using antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) regarding the omnipresence of universals (*sāmānya*). Although the two examples appear in different contexts, we find a common feature in how they use scripturally based inference if we focus on the concept of *abhyupagama*, "hypothetical acceptance." The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed examination of Dharmakīrti's arguments with regard to scripturally based inference, together with the historical background of this type of inference.²

¹ Cf. PVSV (ad PV 1.215) 108,15–109,3. An English translations of this section can be found in Yaita 1987 and Dunne 2004: 362f. The above summary is based on Tillemans 2000: 79. For more details on the threefold analysis, see Tillemans 1993: 9–15, Tillemans 1999: chap. 1 and chap. 2, and Keira 2006.

² The second chapter, "How Much of a Proof is Scripturally Based Inference?" of Tillemans 1999 examines the threefold analysis of scripture, but not this inference in particular. For a detailed analysis of the inference together with its interpretations by Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Dharmottara and Vinītadeva, see Eltschinger 2007: 105–109.

1. Scripturally based inference and the fallacious thesis opposed to authoritative words

The first example of scripturally based inference is found in the following passage of PVSV ad PV 1.215:

[Text 1] *āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmaṃ abhyupagamyā tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ*. PVSV 109,1–3

“Regarding scripturally based inference, too, [it functions for invalidating propositions concerning radically inaccessible states of affairs.] For instance, after one has hypothetically accepted (*abhyupagamyā*) demerit as being of the nature of desire, etc., and as arising from such things, it cannot be taught that bathing in holy water, the *agnihotra*-sacrifice or other things [can] suspend [demerit].”³

In the same manner, PVSV ad PV 1.333 refers to a similar example:

[Text 2] ... *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpaśodhanasāmarthyādikam*. PVSV 174,22–23

“... Moreover, [the proposition:] ‘fire-sacrifices, etc., can purify sins’ is invalidated by a scripturally based inference.”

In order to refute a scripture that accepts physical practices such as ablutions and fire-sacrifices as being able to purify sins and demerits, by relying on scripturally based inference, one can point out that this proposition is contradictory to another proposition in the same scripture, which considers demerits to be characterized by desire or born from it. In this case, since Dharmakīrti does not mention a logical proof (*prayoga*) in the above texts, it remains unclear how the term “inference” is being used in the expression “scripturally based inference.”

This point becomes clear when reading Śākyabuddhi’s commentary on text 1:

³ For a French translation, see Eltschinger 2007: 223. Scripturally based inference is mentioned again in PVSV 174,22f.: ... *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpaśodhanasāmarthyādikam*. “... and [it] is invalidated by the scripturally based inference that *agnihotra*-sacrifice, etc., has the capability of purifying sins, etc.”

[Text 3] ^(a) *dn̄gos po stobs kyis zhugs pa'i tshad ma gnyis kyis lung rnam par dag pa'i dus phyis tshad ma khas len pa can gyi bstan bcos kyis chos can rnam par gzahag nas / snga phyi 'gal ba rjes su dpag pa'i phyir / gang gi tshe khyad par dpyod pa la 'jug pa de'i tshe **lung la ltos pa'i rjes su dpag pa** ste^(a) / lung la ltos pa'i rjes su dpag pa de la ^(b)gnod pa med pa zhes bya ba'i skabs yin no^(b) // PVT D 245a1–6 = P 289a3–5⁴*

“[First of all,] one purifies a scripture by two means of valid cognition that occur by the force of real entities (i.e., perception and *vastubala*-type inference). After that, in order to infer contradictions between previous and posterior [propositions in a scripture,] after having determined a [supersensible] subject/property-possessor of the scripture that is hypothetically accepted to be a *pramāṇa*, **the scripturally based inference** [occurs] at the time when one commences an investigation of [that subject's] specific features. It is contextually connected: “[If the scripture is reliable, then] there is no invalidation [within it] in the case of the scripturally based inference.”⁵

As Eltschinger has pointed out, Śākyabuddhi's exposition is mainly based on PV 4.48–51 and 106–108, where Dharmakīrti discusses the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*), which is unopposed by authoritative words (*āpta*).⁶ According to Śākyabuddhi's exposition, it is possible to accept a scripture only when one has examined it on the basis of perception and *vastubala*-type inferences. One commences an investigation of a scripture primarily to discover contradictions between its propositions. In this investigation, scripturally based inference is used for forming a counter-proposition to the scripture's propositions concerning supersensible subjects or property-possessors (*dharmin*). In the process, one must hypothetically accept the scripture as a *pramāṇa* that teaches supersensible subjects, even though its reliability remains doubtful.

With regard to a scripture's role as a presupposition for inferring supersensible subjects, it might be worthwhile to examine an ex-

⁴ (a) Cf. PVSVT 393,15–17: *viśuddhe viśayadvaye 'tyantaparokṣe cāgama-viśaye paurvāparyavirodhena yasmin cintāṃ pravartayati tasminn āga-māpekṣam anumānam api*. (b) PVSVT 393,17: *abādhanam iti prakṛtam*.

⁵ Cf. Eltschinger 2007: 106.

⁶ Eltschinger 2007: 106.

cursive argument in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3 vv. 26–27, which Dharmakīrti added to his earlier argument in PV 4.106–108. Instead of Dignāga's example: "There is no means of valid cognition that concern their objects" (*na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni*), Dharmakīrti's argument starts with an example of a fallacious thesis that is opposed to scripture (*śāstra*): "Merit (*dharma*) does not bring happiness after one dies" (*pretya dharmo 'sukhapradah*). He explains this as follows:

[Text 4] *dharmivyavasthites tadāśrayāt tatprabādhane 'dhikaraṇapratyastamayān na viśeṣacintāpravṛttir ity avaśyam evaṃvidhe viśaye śāstram pramāṇayitavyam*. PVin 3 30,11–31,1⁷

The determination of a [supersensible] subject [i.e., merit] relies on the [opponent's scripture]. Thus, if one rejects the [scripture], there is no locus [for an inference], and [if there is no locus,] the investigation of specific features (*viśeṣacintā*) [of the locus] does not occur. Thus, concerning such kind of objects, scripture is necessarily to be accepted as being a means of valid cognition.⁸

To investigate whether merits (*dharma*) provide happiness after one's death or not, it is first necessary to accept such supersensible subjects by acknowledging scripture as being a *pramāṇa*. For from the Buddhist point of view, no scripture is accepted as a means of valid cognition concerning *dharma* in the sense of a quality (*guṇa*) as assumed by the Vaiśeṣika, or the correctness of the Veda. However, if the opponent's scripture is not invalidated by perception or the *vastubala*-type inference, one must hypothetically accept the scripture as a means of valid cognition. On the basis of the scripture, one proceeds to investigate whether merits provide happiness after death or not, namely, whether the opponent's thesis is justified by his own scriptural propositions or not.⁹

⁷ PVin D 196b7–197a1 = P 294b7–8: *chos can rnam par gzhas pa de la brten pa'i phyir / de la gnod na gzhi med pas khyad par (D : pa P) la dpyod pa mi 'jug pa'i phyir rnam pa de lta bu'i yul la ni gdon mi za bar bstan bcos tshad mar 'gyur dgos so //*

⁸ Cf. PVA 525,27: *avaśyam evaṃvidhe viśaye śāstram abhyupagantavyam iti*.

⁹ Regarding the above example, it can be assumed that the scripture be-

In this context, Dharmakīrti provides an objection, saying that the above procedure is also applicable for a correct thesis, as for instance: “Demerit is not purified by performing ablutions, etc.” This is because the thesis is opposed by the opponent’s scriptural statement that admits the purification of demerits by verbal and bodily actions such as ablutions.¹⁰ On this objection, which is closely relat-

ing referred to here is not a specific scripture but scripture in general, namely, widely accepted scriptures that teach merit as the cause of happiness after death. Thus, the structure is the same as the fallacious thesis called *āgamavirodhin* that is explained by Praśastapāda and Uddyotakara with the example: “The Brahmin should drink *surā* liquor,” which is invalidated by widely accepted scriptures. Praśastapāda classified the fallacious thesis into five kinds according to five invalidators, namely, (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) what is accepted (*abhyupagata*), (4) one’s own scripture (*svaśāstra*), and (5) one’s own statement (*svavacana*). Of these, the third is also called *āgamavirodhin* by Praśastapāda, and the thesis *brāhmaṇena surā peyā* is presented as its example. The same example is also mentioned by Uddyotakara in his NV 108,3–8 (ad NSū 1.1.33) as an example of *āgamavirodha*. As for the *āgama* in this context, Preisendanz has suggested understanding it as “kulturelle Tradition” and to differentiate it from scripture in its narrow sense, namely, one’s own scripture (*svaśāstra*). Cf. Preisendanz 1994: 322. Consequently, the fallacious theses (3) and (4) in Praśastapāda’s classification can be understood as being concerned with two different kinds of scripture.

¹⁰ Although the opponent who claims that demerits can be purified by bathing, repetition, etc., is not identified, it is noteworthy that *snāna* (bathing in ash) and *japa* (mantra repetition) are included in the Pāśupata *vrata* or religious vows. Dharmakīrti’s rejection of Śaiva exercises for liberation is also found in PV 2.257–261. On the Pāśupata *vrata*, see Oberhammer 1984: 169–178. Moreover, Kamalaśīla refers to the name of Kapila and suggests that the practice of ablution, etc., is fully acceptable for the Sāṃkhya that accepts desire as a kind of the material. Cf. TSP (ad TS 3342) 1063,15–17: *atra rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ vādharmam uddiśya tatprahāṇāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśitaḥ, na tu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihoṭrādir upadiṣṭaḥ*. “To this, after having presented *adharma* as having the nature of desire and so on and as arising from them (i.e., desire, etc.), only the observation of selflessness is taught as the antidote for abandoning the [*adharma*], because [it] is con-

ed to PVSV ad PV 1.215,¹¹ Dharmakīrti emphasizes the importance of *abhyupagama* for determining that a scripture is an invalidator (*bādhaka*) of a thesis. He says:

[Text 5] *katham idānīm na tīrthasnānādir adharmasodhana iti nābhyupetabādhā. sarveṣāṃ adṛṣṭapratipattiśāstrāṇām evam avacanān na pratiṣedhe doṣaḥ. svopagamāśrayaṃ hi śāstraṃ virundhāno vihanyate, nāparam, anabhyupagamāt. tasyāpi snānāc chuddhivādinaḥ śāstrasya svavacanenāpy asyārthasya pratibāadhanāt.* PVin 3 31,1–5¹²

[Objection:] Now,¹³ in the case of [the thesis] “performing ablutions, etc., do not purify demerits” (*na tīrthasnānādir adharmasodhanaḥ*), why is it not [considered] to be an invalidation by the accepted [scripture] (*abhyupetabādhā*)?

[Reply:] Since [except for the opponent’s scripture,] no scripture that teaches the unseen [*adṛṣṭa*, i.e., merit and demerit]¹⁴ proclaims this (i.e., that performing ablutions, etc., purify demerits),¹⁵ there is no fallacy in the negation [of the opponent’s thesis].¹⁶ For the basis [i.e., scripture]

tradictory to the observation of self, the cause of the [*adharma*]. However, different from the teachings of Kapila and so on, [religious practices] such as bathing in holy water and the *agnihotra* sacrifice, which are not contradictory to the cause of the [*adharma*], are not taught.”

¹¹ See above “Text 1.”

¹² PVin 3 D 197a1–3 = P 294b8–295a1–3: *da ni ji ltar ’jug dngogs su khrus byas pa la sogs pa chos ma yin pa dag par byed pa ma yin no zhes bya ba khas blangs pas* (P : pa’i D) *gnod pa ma yin nam zhe na / ma mthong ba rtogs par byed pa’i bstan bcos thams cad de skad mi* (P : ma D) *brjod pa’i phyir bkag pa la skyon yod pa ma yin no // rang gi khas len pa’i rten gyis bstan bcos dang ’gal ba gnod par ’gyur gyi / gzhan ni ma yin te / khas ma blangs pa’i phyir ro // khrus kyis* (P : kyi D) *dag par smra ba’i bstan bcos de’i rang gi tshig gis kyang don de la gnod pa’i phyir ro //*

¹³ PVinT D 45a4 = P 52b1–2: *gal te bstan bcos las grub pa’i chos can la / bstan bcos las ’gal ba smra na bstan bcos kyis gnod na / da ni ...*

¹⁴ PVinT D 45a6 = P 52b5: **ma mthong ba** *chos dang chos ma yin zhes bya bar ...*

¹⁵ PVinT D 45a7 = P 52b6: *khrus kyis* (em. : kyi D, P) *chos ma yin pa sbyong bar byed do ...*

¹⁶ PVinT D 45a6 = P 52b5–6: *chos ma yin pa khrus la sogs pas bzlog par bya ba ni bkag par gyur du zin kyang skyon med do //*

of [the proponent's] own acceptance [would] oppose the [thesis] that is contradictory to the scripture, but not other [scriptures], because [they] are not accepted [by the proponent]. It is because [otherwise] the object [would] be invalidated even by the own scriptural statements of the [opponent,] who claims the purification [of demerits by performing ablutions, etc.].

According to this exposition, the Buddhist claim that demerits cannot be purified by ablutions, etc., is not invalidated by the non-Buddhist scripture. A fallacy of the thesis would only occur if a scripture that the Buddhist accepts as a means of valid cognition were to invalidate the Buddhist claim. However, if one depends on the opponent's scriptural thesis, the claim cannot be refuted because the scripture is not accepted by the Buddhist. In this manner, a scripture's coherency becomes the subject of investigation. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

[Text 6] *lobhādimūlo 'dharma iti sarvaśāstreṣu vyavasthā, alubdhā-dviṣṭāmūḍhānām pāpānabhyupagamāt. sā vyavasthā snānādīnām pā-paśodhanavādaṃ bādhate, nidānāpraśamanena nidānino 'vicchedāt, madhuraśītalasnigdhair iva vyādheḥ ślaiṣmikasyeti. ata eva śāstraḍṣṭeṣv artheṣu virodhodbhāvanaprāyā cintā. yac chāstraṃ vastubalapravṛttena pramāṇena svavacanena cābādhitam ḍṣyāḍṣyayor viṣayayoḥ, tad grāhyam iti.* PVin 3 31,6–11¹⁷

In every scripture it is determined that demerits are rooted in desire, etc., because no sin is accepted as existing in those who have no desire, anger or ignorance. This determination invalidates the [scriptural] statement which says that performing ablutions, etc., purifies demerits, because the effect (*nidānin*) is not destroyed without cessation of its

¹⁷ PVin 3 D 197a4–7 = P 295a3–6: *chos ma yin pa ni bstan bcos thams cad las chags pa la sogs pa'i rtsa ba can du rnam par gzhas pa yin te / ma chags pa dang / sdang ba med pa dang / ma rmongs pa rnam la ni sdig par khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // rnam par gzhas pa des ni khru la sogs pa sdig pa dag par byed bar smra ba* (P cf. PVinT[D] 46a1 : *sna ba D*) *la gnod pa yin no // rgyu ma zad na 'bras bu mi zlog (D : ldog P) pa'i phyir te / mngar ba dang / bsil ba dang / snum pa dag gyis bad kan las gyur pa'i nad bzhin no // de nyid kyi phyir lung gis mthong ba'i don dag la ni 'gal ba brjod pa la cher sems pa yin te / bstan bcos gang zhig mthong ba dang ma mthong ba'i yul dag la dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i tshad ma dang / rang gi tshig gis mi gnod pa de gzung bar bya ba yin no //*

cause (*nidāna*), just as a phlegmatic disease [is not purified] by sweet, cold or oily [things]. And for this precise reason, the investigation (*cintā*) consists mainly in pointing out incoherencies (*virodhodbhāvanā*) with regard to objects observed in scriptures. A scripture that is not invalidated by means of a valid cognition functioning through the force of real entities and [the scripture's] own words with regard to empirical objects and transempirical objects [, respectively,] is to be accepted.

In opposition to the scriptural thesis “demerits are not purified by performing ablutions, etc.,” on the basis of the same scripture, one can formulate the counter-thesis “demerits are rooted in mental factors such as desire, etc.” While these two theses indirectly contradict each other, the second is justified by the empirical rule that no effect ceases without the cessation of its cause. As Eltschinger has pointed out, the example of the causal relationship together with the example of phlegmatic disease is used by both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, the former when presenting two pervasion formulas (*vyāpti*) and the latter when formulating a proof based on *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*.¹⁸

Dharmakīrti concludes this section (PVin 3 31,10–11) with a statement resembling PV 4.108, where it is described how to determine which scriptures are reliable and which are unreliable by using ordinary means of valid cognition and the scripture's own words. The latter is glossed “scripturally based inference” by the commentator

¹⁸ Eltschinger 2007: 109, fn. 134. Cf. PVT D 245a5f.: *gang zhig gang gi rgyu la gnod pa mi byed pa de ni de'i gnod pa can ma yin te / dper na bad kan can gyi nad la mngar ba dang bsil ba dang smus pa'i rjes dag gnod pa can ma yin pa dag lta bu'o // khrus la sogs pa ni sdig pa'i rgyu la gnod pa byed pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //* “[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever does not remove the cause of a certain thing (x) does not remove the thing (x), for example, sweet, cold or oily things do not remove phlegmatic disease. [*Pakṣadharmatā*:] Bathing in holy water and other things (e.g., the *agnihotra* sacrifice) do not remove the cause of demerits. [Type of reason:] This is on the basis of the reason of cognition of the contradictory to the pervader (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*).” This proof is also mentioned by the Tibetan philosopher mKhas grub rje in his commentary on the PV 4; cf. *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, f. 61a5f. For the reason, see also NB 2.38: *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nātra tuṣārasparśo vahner iti //*

Manorathanandin.¹⁹ Here, scripturally based inference, based on the same scripture, is used to invalidate a thesis that refers to supersensible objects. This style of invalidation is basically the same as that demonstrated by Dignāga in his *Nyāyamukha* with the example: “For the Aulūkyā [i.e. Vaiśeṣika, who does not accept the permanence of sound but nevertheless claims that] ‘sound is eternal,’ [the thesis] is invalidated by [his] previously accepted position (*pūrvābhyupagama*).”²⁰ For Dharmakīrti’s division between supersensible objects and other objects, the thesis is not concerned with radically inaccessible states of affairs. Dharmakīrti’s example of purification of demerit is seemingly an updated version of the fallacious thesis called *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*.²¹

To summarize, the scripturally based inference possesses the following characteristics:

- 1 In order to investigate the specific features of an opponent’s scripture that teaches a supersensible subject (*dharmin*), an inference is made that is based on a hypothetical acceptance of that scripture.
- 2 This inference consists in a thesis that is contradictory to the opponent’s thesis on the subject.
- 3 Other than the thesis, the elements of a logical proof (*prayoga*) are not mentioned in the above discussions.²²

¹⁹ Manorathanandin glosses the word *svavācā* in PV 4.108 as “by scripturally based inference.” Cf. PVV 450,16: *svavācāgamāśrayeṇānumānena*.

²⁰ Cf. Katsura 1977: 113–114. For the Sanskrit text, see PVA 526,19f.

²¹ This fallacy is defined in Dignāga’s NMu: 或先所立宗義相違、如獯狐子立声為常. Cf. Katsura 1977: 113. Note that in its Sanskrit fragment (cf. PVA 526,19f.: *pūrvābhyupagamena vā, yathaulūkyasyānityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ*), there is no equivalent for 宗義 (**siddhānta*?). Praśastapāda calls the fallacy *svāśāstravirodhin* and presents the example: *vaiśeṣikasya sat kāryam*. Uddyotakara rejects Dignāga’s idea of this fallacy and regards it as a fallacious thesis that is opposed to inference. Cf. NV 108,3–8. In contrast, Kumārila accepts the fallacious thesis as a kind of contradiction with words (*śabdavirodha*); cf. ŚV *anumāna* 61cd–65ab. For *pakṣābhāsa*, see Inami 1991.

²² The inference in the present context functions as an equivalent of the scripture’s statement itself. In this case, since we know only the thesis

2. Antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) and scripturally based inference

Another example of scripturally based inference is found in a discussion on the fallacious reason called *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, or “antinomic reason”, an example that may help us understand the formal structure of this type of inference. In NB 3.110–120, an excursive argument on the three kinds of fallacious reasons, Dharmakīrti discusses the *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, which Dignāga counts as a type of inconclusive reason (*anaikāntika*).²³ According to Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3 vv. 23–24 and its *Vṛtti*, if two reasons concluding two contradictory propositions to be proved are stated together, these two reasons cause doubt (*saṃśaya*). To this, Dharmakīrti claims that a non-deviant reason (*avyabhicārin*), namely, a correct reason, is only possible if an inference occurs that is based on reasons of effect (*kārya*), essential property (*svabhāva*), or non-cognitions (*anupalabdhi*), which are all dependent on real entities (*vastu*).²⁴ The fallacious reason *viruddhāvyabhicārin* arises when applying scripturally based inference. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

[Text 7] *tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ*. NB 3.114

Therefore, [Dignāga] has [taught] the fallacious reason [called] *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the case of the investigations of [scriptural] objects

to be invalidated and that which functions as the invalidator, it is uncertain whether their reasons and triple characteristics are also based on scripture or not. According to PV 4.92, the invalidator (*bādhaka*) is considered a kind of *kāryahetu*. Cf. Tillemans 2000: 126–130.

²³ I follow Tillemans’ translation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as “antinomic reasons”. As for Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the fallacy, see Tani 1987b, Tillemans 2000: 92–94. For Dignāga’s argument on the fallacy, cf. PS 3.23–24 and its *Vṛtti*; Kitagawa 1973: 192–199. Regarding the example of PS 3.23–24, Dharmakīrti comments that Dignāga used it only to indicate the direction (*dīnṃ mātradarśana, phyogs tsam bstan pa*) in which to proceed. Cf. PVin 3 130,13 (D 228a4 = P 327a5; PST P 192b2).

²⁴ NB 3.110–113.

by relying on scripturally based inference, which functions without the observation of real entities.²⁵

If one formulates an inference based on observing real entities (*vastu-darśana*), in Dharmakīrti's system of logic this can only involve inferring a cause from its effect (e.g. fire from smoke), inferring a property from a related property of one and the same entity (e.g. tree-ness from *śiṃśapā*-ness), or formulating negative inferences on the basis of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). In these cases, an entity/property is related to another entity/property either through a causal relationship (*tadutpatti*), or full or partial identity (*tādātmya*). In contrast to the *real* world (at least for the Buddhist), in the other worlds or metaphysical systems that have been conceptually constructed by authors of heretical scriptures (*śāstrakārāḥ* = *tīrthikaśāstrapraṇetāraḥ*), it is possible that two contradictory properties have been wrongly ascribed to one and the same entity.²⁶ In this case, two contradictory

²⁵ Cf. also PVin 3 128,4–5 (D 227a4). According to Kamalaśīla, this statement is against certain Buddhist insiders who claim that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as a kind of inconclusive reason occurs even in an inference that functions through the force of real entities. Cf. NBPS D 98b3–5 = P 121a8–b2: *rang gi sde pa kha cig ni dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa la yang 'gal ba mi 'khrul pa can zhes bya ba ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs yod do zhes brjod de / de la dper brjod pa ni dper na sgra mi rtag pa ste byas pa'i phyir bum pa lta bu'o zhes bya ba la yang* (D : yang om. P) *gang gi tshe gzhan zhig gis brgal te / sgra ni rtag pa ste mnyan par bya ba yin pa'i phyir sgra nyid lta bu'o zhes smras pa de'i tshe sbyor ba snga ma ma nges pa yin no zhes zer ro zhes grags te / de dgag pa'i phyir 'gal ba mi 'khrul ba can yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so //*. On the other hand, in the *anumānaparīkṣā* chapter of the TSP, he discusses this kind of fallacy by arguing against the author of the *Tattvaṭīkā*, Aviddhakarṇa, who rejects the inference for oneself (*svārthanumāna*) for the reason that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is possible in every inference. To this, Kamalaśīla answers that this fallacy does not apply in the case of objects of *vastubala*-type inferences. Cf. TSP ad 1458 and 1473. On the difference between the *vastubala*-type inference and scripturally based inference, see also HBT 216,15–18.

²⁶ Cf. NB 3.115: *śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhrāntiyā viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhārasambhavāt*. Cf. PVin 3 128,5–6 (D 227a4). Durvekamiśra comments on *śāstrakārāḥ* as *tīrthikaśāstrapraṇetāraḥ* (DhPr 227,17).

inferences occur with respect to the same subject. Their reasons are considered *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Dharmakīrti presents as an example of this the following two proofs concerning universals (*sāmānya*), which are both based on the Vaiśeṣika system of metaphysics.

[Proof 1]

[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever is simultaneously connected with its relata that reside everywhere is omnipresent, like the ether (*ākāśa*).

[*Pakṣadharmatva*:] And universals are simultaneously connected with their relata residing everywhere.²⁷

[Proof 2]

[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever is not cognized, despite its fulfilling the conditions for being cognized, does not exist there, like a pot that is absent from a certain place.

[*Pakṣadharmatva*:] And universals are not cognized in the intervals between particulars (*vyaktyantarāla*), despite their fulfilling the conditions for being cognized.²⁸

According to Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla, these two proofs were constructed by two different Vaiśeṣika authors, Pailuka and Paiṭhara, who are both said to have been pupils of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system.²⁹ In the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Dharmottara introduces the first proof as follows:

²⁷ NB 3.117: *yat sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapat abhisambadhyate tat sarvagatam, yathākāśam. abhisambadhyate ca sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapat sāmānyam iti*. Cf. PVin 3 128,8–9 (D 227a4–6 = P 326a6f.).

²⁸ NB 3.120: *yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ san nopalabhyate na tat tatrāsti, tadyathā kvacid avidyamāno ghaṭaḥ. nopalabhyate copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sāmānyam vyaktyantarāleṣv iti*. Cf. PVin 3 129,12–130,1 (D 227b5f. = P 326b6f.). The proof is originally considered to be a refutation of omnipresence of the universals. However, later Buddhist logicians such as Paṇḍita Aśoka and Mokṣākaragupta considered the proof as a refutation of the existence of the universals. Cf. TBh 56,15–57,4; Kajiyama 1998: 129f. and fn. 351.

²⁹ Cf. NBT 228,7f., 231,6; NBPS D 98b5f. = P 121b2–4. Jitāri also mentions the two authors' names, but this is probably due to Dharmottara's influence. Cf. HTU 267,5–16.

[Text 8] *iha sāmānyam kaṇādamaharṣiṇā niṣkriyam dṛśyam ekaṃ cokatam. yugapac ca sarvaiḥ svaiḥ sambandhibhiḥ samavāyena sambaddham. tatra pailukena kaṇādaśiṣyeṇa vyaktiṣu vyaktirahiteṣu ca deśeṣu sāmānyam sthitam sādhayitum pramāṇam idam upanyastam.* NBT 228,7–229,1

Here, Kaṇāda, the great sage, has claimed universals to be immovable (*niṣkriya*), perceptible (*dṛśya*) and singular (*eka*). Moreover, [universals] are simultaneously connected to all their relata by [the relation of] inherence (*samavāya*). On this [i.e., Kaṇāda's claim], Pailuka, Kaṇāda's pupil, states the means of valid cognition [i.e., inference of the proof 1] in order to prove that universals exist in particulars and places without particulars.

In this explanation, Dharmottara states that Kaṇāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, considers the universals to be motionless, perceptible and singular. Furthermore, the reason formulated in proof 1, namely, being simultaneously connected to their relata, also derives from Kaṇāda's statements. However, in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'s descriptions, these characteristics are not explicitly mentioned. As Halbfass has pointed out, "Kaṇāda does not introduce *sāmānya* with a definition" and "apart from the dubious Sūtra 1,1,4, it is not even listed, or referred to, as a category (*padārtha*)."³⁰ Therefore, it is uncertain how much of Dharmottara's explanation really reflects the Vaiśeṣika's historical background on universals.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that following the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Praśastapāda defines *sāmānya* as being omnipresent in its objects (*svaviśayasarvatraḡa*),³¹ but mentions that it is non-designated in the interval (*antarāla*) between particulars. This is paraphrased by the commentator Śrīdhara as "non-existence in the ether or space or immobile wind or the absence of corporeal substances."³² If this in-

³⁰ Halbfass 1992: 116.

³¹ Cf. PDhS 81,2f.

³² Cf. PDhS 83,3: *antarāle ca saṃyogasamavāyavṛttiyabhāvād avyapadeśyānīti*. Śrīdhara's commentary on this part is as follows. NKand 677,18–678,3: *antarālam ity ākāśam vā digdravyam vā stimitavāyur vā mūrtadravyābhāvo vā, teṣu gotvādisāmānyānām na saṃyogo nāpi samavāyaḥ. na cāsambaddhānām eva teṣām avasthāne pramāṇam asti. ato 'ntarāle na sāmānyāni vyapadiśyante na santīty arthaḥ.*

terpretation is correct, Praśastapāda's system seemingly holds two incompatible positions regarding the issue of the omnipresence of *sāmānya*.

How, then, can one understand the role in these two proofs of a scripture included in Praśastapāda's system? First of all, the subject or property-possessor of the two proofs, *sāmānya*, is taken as being supersensible and a subject that is only established by scripture.³³ In proof 1, *pakṣadharmatva* is also known from scripture, as for instance, from Praśastapāda's definition of universals being present in many substances (*anekavṛtti*). But, in the same manner, in proof 2, *pakṣadharmatva* seems to be based on another passage of Praśastapāda, namely that universals are not designated in the space between particulars because there is no occurrence of their connections and inferences.³⁴

Consequently, if one accepts Praśastapāda's metaphysical system, these two proofs guarantee the validity of both theses: the omnipresence of universals but also their non-omnipresence. Since these theses are mutually incompatible with regard to one and the same subject, this causes doubt in the mind of the audience.

³³ From the Buddhist viewpoint, the *sāmānya* of the Vaiśeṣika is categorized as a kind of radically inaccessible object. Cf. NBṬ 227,1f.: *tasyāgamasya yo 'rtho 'tīndriyaḥ pratyakṣānumānābhyām aviśayīkṛtaḥ sāmānyādis tasya vicāreṣu prakrānteṣv āgamāśrayam anumānaṃ sambhavati*. From the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint, however, it is a perceptible object. Cf. TBh 57,2f.: *idaṃ tu [sāmānyaṃ] cakṣurvijñānagrāhyam, arthadharmatvāt. pratyakṣaṃ ca parair iṣṭam iti*. A question arises on this point: If *sāmānya* is a kind of radically inaccessible object, then why are the opponents' other dogmatic objects such as *ātman* and *īśvara* not considered radically inaccessible in the same manner? In PVSV ad PV 1.215, these objects are considered invalidated by the *vastubala*-type inference, not by scripturally based inference. Of these objects, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's proofs of *īśvara* are structured such that the proof of a general property to be proved implies the proof of the special property to be proved. The former proof is based on the connection of real entities.

³⁴ PDhS 83,3: *antarāle ca saṃyogasamavāyavṛttyabhāvād avyapadeṣyānīti*.

If compared with what we have seen in the argument on scripturally based inference as invalidating the scriptural thesis on the purification of *adharma*, the present argument on *viruddhāvyabhicārin* shares the following common features:

- 1' The scripturally based inference occurs by force of the hypothetical acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of scriptural statements on supersensible matters such as *sāmānya* and its properties.³⁵
- 2' The two theses of the proofs on the *sāmānya*'s omnipresence contradict one another.

In addition, the present argument makes the structure of the inference clear, as follows:

- 3' The scripturally based inference fulfils the triple conditions of a valid reason, as long as one accepts the world view constructed in the scripture.

3. Scripturally based inference and NSū 1.1.31 and 1.2.6

In Dharmakīrti's discussions on scripturally based inference, we have so far seen two common characteristics, namely, the hypothet-

³⁵ Cf. PVin 3 130,12: *tad ayam abhyupagamabalapravrttaḥ* (D 228a4 = P 327a4f.: *de bas na 'di ni khas blangs pa'i stobs kyis 'jug pa yin no //*). Cf. also PVinṬ D 171b3 = P 201b3: *de bas na 'gal ba mi (mi P : ni mi D) 'khrul pa can 'di ni khas blangs pa'i stobs kyis 'jug pa yin gyi / dngos po la brten pa ni ma yin no //*. Cf. NBṬ 233,2–5: *yataḥ sāmānyasyaikasya yugapat sarvadeśāvasthitair abhisambandhitvaṃ cābhyupagatam, dṛśyatvaṃ ca, tataḥ sarvasambandhitvāt sarvagatatvam, dṛśyativād antarālānupalambhād* (DhPr 233, fn. 5 : *antarālād anupalambhād* ed.) *asarvagatatvam. tataḥ śāstrakāreṇaiva viruddhavyāptatvam apaśyatā viruddhavyāptau dharmāv uktvā viruddhāvyabhicāryavakāśo datta iti*. "Since [the author of scripture] has accepted that a single universal is simultaneously connected with [particulars] residing everywhere and that [the universal] is perceptible, [one can infer] that [the universal] is omnipresent because [it] is connected to everything and that [the universal] is not omnipresent because it is perceptible but not perceived in the spaces in between. Therefore, after the author of scripture, who does not see that [the universal] is pervaded by two contradictory [properties], has claimed two properties, of which both are pervaded by contradictory [properties], the occasion of antinomic reason is given."

ical acceptance of an opponent's scripture that teaches a radically inaccessible state of affairs, and the inference's nature of invalidating a thesis of the opponent by that thesis being contradictory to the opponent's own position. Although the inference itself is valid in its internal coherency regarding the reason and examples, one can show that it is contradictory by introducing a piece of external evidence based on a second inference. While this idea of scripturally based inference can be traced back to Dignāga's treatments of fallacies of thesis and reason, namely, *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha* and *viruddhāvvyabhicārin*, if one searches further, its origin can be seen in the ancient debate tradition of India, especially in the concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha* in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

First of all, let us start by defining *abhyupagamasiddhānta*, the fourth type of *siddhānta* after the other three, namely, *sarvatantrasiddhānta*, *pratitantrasiddhānta*, and *adhikaraṇasiddhānta*. The definition of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* in the NSū is as follows:³⁶

[Text 9] *aparīkṣitābhyupagamāt tadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇam abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ* // NSū 1.1.31

The hypothetical tenet is [used in] the investigation of specific features of the [subject] after having hypothetically accepted [the subject] that has not yet been examined.

³⁶ On the *abyupagamasiddhānta* in NSū 1.1.31 and its interpretation by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Prof. Hiroshi Marui (2012) presented a detailed analysis at the international conference "World view and theory in Indian Philosophy" held in Barcelona on 28 April 2009. In the presentation Marui pointed out that Jayanta's interpretation of the *abhyupagamasiddhānta* does not differ from that of Pakṣilasvāmin. After Uddyotakara's new interpretation, the dialectical role of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* was lost in the Nyāya tradition. Marui's final remark says that Jayanta's interpretation of NSū 1.1.31 "represents a certain historical phase of the shifting process of Nyāya System from the science of dialectics to the *pramāṇasāstra* in which more and more emphasis was laid on the dependence of *siddhānta* upon the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇamūlatva*), whereas less and less stress was placed on its implications for the dialectical dynamism which presupposes the lively tension of the multi-doctrinal world of debate." I would like to thank Prof. Marui for sending me the paper he read at the conference, which will be published soon.

According to Pakṣilasvāmin's commentary, a tenet is hypothetically adopted, for instance, in the debate on sound's eternity between the Naiyāyika, who accepts sound to be a quality of the ether (*ākāśaguṇa*), and the Mīmāṃsaka, who declares that sound is a substance. In the debate, the Naiyāyika starts by hypothetically accepting the subject of the examination, "Let sound be a substance" (*astu dravyam śabdah*), and examines the specific feature whether sound is eternal or non-eternal. In this case the hypothetical acceptance of the Mīmāṃsaka's tenet of sound's substance-ness is called a "hypothetical tenet." Pakṣilasvāmin comments that one uses such hypothetical tenets in order to display one's more distinguished knowledge and to look down on the knowledge of the opponent.³⁷

We find a similar procedure regarding scripturally based inference, that is, a hypothetical acceptance of an opponent's tenet or scripture on the subject of a proof for investigating its specific features in the proof.

With regard to presuming the hypothetical tenet, the author of the NSū further defines the fallacious reason called *viruddha* as follows:³⁸

[Text 10] *siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ* // NSū 1.2.6

After one has hypothetically accepted the [opponent's] tenet, [the reason] which is contradictory to the [hypothetical tenet] is [called the fallacy of] contradiction.³⁹

³⁷ Cf. NBh (ad NSū 1.1.31) 29,15–30,2.

³⁸ Preisendanz 1994: 321 has pointed out the correspondence between Dignāga's definition of the fallacious thesis being opposed to authority and this passage in the NSū as follows: "Am Rande sei hier bemerkt, dass (3) (Nr. 2 in NMukha = *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*) eine Entsprechung in der sicherlich älteren Definition des *viruddhahetvābhāsa* in NSū 1.2.6 hat (*siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ*; Verweis schon bei Faddegón, *Vaiśeṣika-System*, p. 322), die verdeutlicht, dass die *hetvābhāsa* des NSū ursprünglich in den Bereich der Disputationsregel und der Verstöße gegen sie gehörten."

³⁹ Cf. Tillemans 2000: 71, fn. 245 (ad PV 4.43). Matilal (1985: 44) says that the *viruddha* is "enigmatically defined in NSū 1.2.6" and that "most probably, it meant something very different from what the later tradi-

As P. P. Gokhale has pointed out, this type of fallacy “can be compared with *siddhāntaviruddha* of Caraka,”⁴⁰ who classified three kinds of *viruddhas* as points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), namely, *ḍṣṭāntaviruddha*, *siddhāntaviruddha*, and *samayaviruddha*, under the fallacy of a claim (*vākyadoṣa*). Although later Naiyāyikas interpret this fallacy as being the reason contradicting the thesis (*prati-jñā*) of the same proof, the NSū’s original meaning should be understood differently: the reason is incoherent with regard to a tenet of the opponent that is external to the proof itself. This is explained by Pakṣilasvāmin, for instance, by using the Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s two proofs of primordial matter (*pradhāna*):⁴¹

[Proof 3]

[Thesis:] Transformed matter (*vikāra*) withdraws after it has manifested [itself],

[reason:] because permanence is denied.

[Proof 4]

[Thesis:] Even if transformed matter withdraws, it exists,

[reason:] because destruction is denied.

In this case, the reason in proof 3, “denial of permanence” (*nityatva-pratiṣedha*), that is, impermanence, is incoherent with regard to the opponent’s tenet shown in the thesis of proof 4: “transformed matter exists even if it withdraws.” For the Naiyāyika who supports the position of *asatkāryavāda*, both proofs are basically unacceptable. Nonetheless, if the opponent’s tenet is hypothetically accepted,⁴² the

tion in Nyāya understood as *viruddha*.”

⁴⁰ Gokhale 1992: 24.

⁴¹ NBh 43,11–14: *yathā so ’yaṃ vikāro vyakter apaiti, nityatvapraṭiṣedhāt. na nityo vikāra upapadyate. apeto ’pi vikāro ’sti vināśapraṭiṣedhāt. so ’yaṃ nityatvapraṭiṣedhād iti hetur vyakter apeto ’pi vikāro ’stīty anena sva-siddhāntena virudhyate.* Cf. YBh 247,2f. (ad YS 3.13): *tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti, nityatvapraṭiṣedhāt. apetaṃ apy asti, vināśapraṭiṣedhāt;* YD 128,22–129,1: *tathā ca vārṣagaṇāḥ paṭhanti “tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti na sattvāt. apetaṃ apy asti, vināśapraṭiṣedhāt.”* Cf. also Oberhammer 2006: 147f.

⁴² Cf. NBh 43,11–44,2.

Naiyāyika can point out the fallacy of *viruddha* in the opponent's proof. In other words, even if one accepts proof 3 as showing valid reasoning, it becomes invalid by the force of proof 4, which functions as an invalidator, just as scripturally based inference does.

In this manner, the main structure of Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference is shared in part with the two early Nyāya concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha*, which both should be understood in the context of the *vāda*-tradition. There, the debater could refute his opponent's proof not only by means of its internal incoherency, but also by means of its incoherency with regard to the opponent's tenets or the system of his scripture. Although Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference does not seem to be used in the actual debate and its scope is limited to radically inaccessible states of affairs, its function is essentially the same as these early Nyāya concepts. Accordingly, unlike the *vastubala*-type of inference, scripturally based inference only functions for invalidating the opponent's scriptural propositions by the force of other propositions within the same scripture. It cannot be used for proving one's own scriptural propositions.

4. Conclusion

From the above examination, I believe that the significance of *abhyupagama* in scripturally based inference has become clear. One of Dharmakīrti's contributions to the development of Dignāga's logic consists in his efforts to distinguish radically inaccessible states of affairs from the real entities upon which our ordinary judgments of truth depend. Owing to this distinction, he succeeds in establishing a logical system based on *svabhāvapratibandha*, the necessary relationship between real entities and their properties. As a result, however, certain concepts relating to radically inaccessible states of affairs are expelled from the realm in which usual inferences occur. The scripturally based inference relates to the realm of super-sensible matters and presupposes a world or a system based on the *abhyupagama* of a certain scripture. By assuming the internal co-

herency of such a scriptural world or system, it becomes possible to point out the inconsistencies in scriptural descriptions.⁴³

As we have seen when comparing this to the early Nyāya concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha*, in the *vāda*-tradition the notion of *abhyupagama* functions as a means for introducing a hypothetical negative argument that is then used to refute the opponent's philosophical system. Dharmakīrti's notion of scripturally based inference is also understood in this line. Consequently, even if one does not accept an opponent's dogmatic subject, it is possible to formulate a hypothetical reasoning based on the *abhyupagama* of the opponent's philosophical system in order to finally reject that system by pointing out the fallacies of *śāstraviruddha* or *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. In the process, the *abhyupagama* of the opponent's tenet forms a possible world that is different from reality, and becomes the basis for finding an invalidating factor in the opponent's thesis. It might now be interesting to examine Dharmakīrti's treatment of counterfactual conditionals, known by the technical term *sādhya viparyaya bādhakapramāṇa*, as a variation of such an *abhyupagama* argument, but its analysis is beyond the scope of this presentation.

Primary literature and abbreviations

D – J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima (eds.), *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ḥgyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Tshad ma 1–21. Tokyo 1981ff.

DhPr – *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): See NB.

HBṬ – *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Arcaṭa): S. Sanghavi & Muni Shri Jinavijayaji (eds.), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary entitled Āloka of*

⁴³ However, whether the Buddhist scriptures are really free of the fallacies of *śāstraviruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* still remains to be examined. For instance, we know that Kumābila attacked the Yogācāra proof of *vijñaptimātratā* by pointing out various fallacies, including *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Cf. *ŚV nirālamba*, vv. 69–73 (*pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*, *buddhābhiprāyaviruddha*) and vv. 77–78 (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*).

Durveka Miśra. Baroda 1949.

HTU – *Hetutattvopadeśa* (Jitāri): G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*. Part I. Roma: IsMEO 1956, pp. 261–274.

NB – *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): D. Malvania (ed.), *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1955.

NBh – *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Pakṣilasvāmin): A. Thakur (ed.), *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1997.

NBPS – *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa* (Kamalaśīla): *Rigs pa'i thigs pa'i phyogs snga ma mdor bsdus pa*. D no. 4232, P no. 5731.

NBT – *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See NB.

NKand – *Nyāyakandalī* (Śrīdhara): J. S. Jetly (ed.), *Nyāyakandalī, being a commentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya, with three sub-commentaries*. Vadodara: Oriental Institute 1991.

NSū – *Nyāyasūtra*: See NBh.

P – Daisetz T. Suzuki, *The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking edition*. Tokyo/Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute 1957.

PDhS – *Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha* (Praśastapāda): J. Bronkhorst and Y. Ramseier (eds.), *Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya: A Complete Word Index to the Printed Editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasi-dass Publishers 1994.

PV 1 – *Pramāṇavārttika*, *svārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.

PV 4 – *Pramāṇavārttika*, *parārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): See Tillemans 2000.

PVA – *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute 1953.

PVin 3 – *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *parārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): Pascale Hugon & Toru Tomabechi (eds.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapter 3*. With a preface by Tom J.F. Tillemans. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2011
= *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa*. D no. 4211, P no. 5710.

PVinṭ – **Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad*. D no. 4227, Tshe 1b1–178a3 (Commentary on PVin 3) = P no. 5227.

PVP – **Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi): *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi*

'grel pa. D no. 4217, P no. 5717.

PVSV – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*. Roma 1960.

PVṬ – **Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi): *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad*. D no. 4220, P no. 5718.

PVV – *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*. Appendices to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24/3–26/3, 1938–1940.

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ŚV – *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila): D. Shāstrī (ed.), *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasarathi Miśra*. Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978.

TBh – *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta): H. R. R. Iyengar (ed.), *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Mysore: The Hindusthan Press 1952.

TSP – *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): S. D. Shastri (ed.), *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā'*. Vol. 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1981.

YBh – *Yogabhāṣya* (Vyāsa): P. S. R. Sastri & S. R. K. Sastri (eds.), *Pātañjala-Yoga-sūtra-Bhāṣya Vivaraṇam of Śāṅkara-Bhagavatpāda*. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library 1952.

YD – *Yuktidīpikā*: A. Wezler & Sh. Motegi (eds.), *Yuktidīpikā*. Vol. I. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1998.

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Recently, Prof. Takashi Iwata has published an article concerning the role of scripture in Dharmakīrti's logic, which contains several remarkable investigations on his concept of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and scripturally based inference: Takashi Iwata, Mujun tairitsu suru meidai no hitei wa ika ni kanō ka – syōgon ya ronsho nado ni motozuita hitei no ronri [How is the negation of contradictory propositions possible? The logic of negation based on authoritative words and scripture], *Tōyō no shisō to shūkyō* 27 (2010) 1–45. Unfortunately, I was not able to take his results into consideration in the present paper.

Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Eli Franco and Prof. Helmut Krasser for their valuable comments on the previous versions of this paper

